

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

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MAY 1928

We Practise What You Preach

Daniel A. Lord

Thoughts on Materialism

Leo C. Brown

On Adversaries

J. A. Gasson

Conscience

R. H. Witte

St. Thomas on the Teacher

Joseph A. Foley

Philosophy and Friendship

An Editorial

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

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THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

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Philosophy and Friendship

Mountains have always inspired the human mind to thought. Whether you break from the city of Calgary and look far to the west at the impassable wall of white glittering in the morning sun, or stand silent before the grandeur of the Jungfrau, or admire the graceful lines of Fujiyama, or look far across the plains from Darjeeling to the silent heights of Everest, you are sure to be im-

pressed. Mountains have always been symbolic to man. They were worshipped by ancient pagans; modern Christians crown them with crucifixion groups. Olympus means the serenity of heaven, Everest points towards eternity, Aetna stands for faith.

The towering peak, deep-robed with age-old snow, is a symbol both of ruggedness and friendliness. Unswayed by the storms of thousands

of years, it points ever upward towards heaven and God. And yet, such hardy folk as build their huts up on the mountain slope, and spend their lives its protecting shadow grow to consider it an intimate friend. They weave its presence into the fabric of their lives, they make it part of themselves. Day in and day out, they watch the last rays of the setting sun play upon its snow clad peak and awake to find another morn breaking over its shoulder.

We have all known men who might well be likened to the imperishable crags of stone. The resemblance of Hawthorne's hero to the Great Stone Face was more a matter of soul than of body. We have seen men of set countenance and whitened hair, men with the scars of years of righteous fighting, men waiting after the final victories for the last call to reward eternal, men who have inspired us with their calm gaze upon the world and their stern fidelity to good and truth, but these same men have impressed us even more by their air of friendliness - not surface coating, but a deep down realization of the true brotherhood of man. Such men have an eager sollicitation for the weaker and younger, a strong sense of sympathy, and steadfastness in their friendships - in a word, true character; and we have prayed to so live that we may if God gives us life, some day find ourselves stamped with the rugged tenderness of the mountain.

The Catholic man of affairs who thus approaches his end has undoubtedly founded his rule of life upon true philosophy, but it is just as true that he has more than philosophy to thank. Cardinal Newman possessed an acute mind, he made great use of logic and philosophy and won battles with them as weapons, but that does not account for the human interest in his autobiography, that did not make all England applaud when in 1879 the life blood he had lost in the good fight for the Church was symbolized by the color he took as he became "My Cardinal." That did not place the names of practically all English men of letters on the list of his eulogists. That did not account for the love and affection for this simple man in the hearts of simple folk.

Cardinal Newman had the confident strength that came of long association

with philosophy. But he also had that indefinable quality that told of his constant use of friendships. Say what you will, the constant thesis after thesis mill of merely classroom philosophy takes its toll of imagination and human sympathy unless the student looks through the theory to life. This was a fact that Cardinal Newman knew well.

In earliest school days we find him the enthusiast of friendship. His first dealings with his first masters, Hawkins and Whately were in the form of friendships. Even the books he read were Augustine, Cyprian, Basil come to life; he kissed them goodbye when he left Littlemore for the last time. He was ever the conversationalist, the man who walked the roads of Oxford with bent head and hands clasped behind, revelling in the companionship of some kindred spirit. Later in life his communion of spirit with Ambrose St. John made George Eliot exclaim with wonder and Wilfrid Meynell to say that the world had reason to be grateful to Newman "for this infusion of tenderness into the relations of man with man."

Cardinal Newman had more than philosophy. He was a clever enough logician to know the limits which human nature put upon his own science: "One is not at all pleased when poetry, or eloquence, or devotion, is considered as if chiefly intended to feed syllogisms." His love of theory was tempered by an intense interest in fellow man, and thus it was he came to old age, the scarred veteran of battles for truth, but no less the benign father and friend of all.

I once listened to a philosophical paper. I think the theory was perfect; I cannot say for sure, for I could not bring myself to listen to it. Some called it philosophy; perhaps a better name would be philosophical theory. Philosophy is built upon relations, and one of the termini is man, that incalculable, uncertain, mirror of God, that divinely made combination of smiles and tears, that paragon of all creation. True philosophy, having him for a terminus, can not be dry to a kindred creature any more than it can be pessimistic while God is in His heaven. Theories are fine, are necessary, and a philosopher must strive for accuracy. But when such

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We Practice What You Preach

Rev. Daniel A. Lord, S.J.

The December 1927 issue of the SCHOOLMAN contained Father Lord's forceful statements contending that philosophers could do nothing more conducive to their scholastic success than to give forth again the philosophy they had assimilated by writing it out. The present vivid story is proof that Father Lord himself had "practiced what he preaches," for he wrote it during his own philosophate career. It is through the kind permission of the Editor of America, that this article appears in our magazine.

The eminent professor of psychology sat meditatively gazing into his grate, warming his soul at the brisk fire. The attitude was conventional and the exterior person of the professor was conventional; but aside from that there was little conventionality in the man. On the table near at hand lay the manuscript of the lecture he was to deliver to his class on the morrow, and now he sat conjuring up the faces of the two hundred young men who would drink in his revolutionary doctrine with something akin to excitement. All the afternoon he had labored at that lecture; blow after blow of his trip-hammer logic he had aimed at the obsolete doctrine of free will, and now the lecture lay there a miniature bomb ready for the terrific explosion.

THE THEORY

Beginning with the self-evident proposition that man is a mere physico-chemical machine without more soul than a billiard ball, he had traced the compelling power of heredity and environment upon the actions of that machine. "There is no such thing as sin," so ran his triumphant conclusion; "crime is but a psychical disease." Man is no more responsible for his crimes than he is for his weak tonsils, his falling hair or his tendency to insanity. With the delusion of free will, primitive man tickled his vanity. Science knows that it is as false as his creed in a happy hunting ground. Man is not free, but a slave."

The flame in the grate flickered, died down, then leaped into new life. There was an uproarious shout in the street such as only college boys can or dare utter. A moment's pause and then was heard a sharp rap at his door.

"Come in." said the professor, who prided himself on his personal interest in his students. The door was flung open upon a youth whose clothes were a taunt to dignified reserve. He stood for a moment abashed in the sacred shrine of learning, and then impulsively offered the professor his hand.

"I've just dropped in," he said, "to congratulate you on your afternoon lecture on free will. It was the most important event in my life."

For a moment the professor was puzzled. He glanced at his deck calendar. To be sure, he had delivered that revolutionary lecture this very afternoon. Why had he fancied it was to be tomorrow?

"Sit down, my boy," he said, and his glowing countenance cast the flickering fire into complete shadow. "Delighted! Glad you liked it. It's a satisfaction to know that the undergraduate appreciates the fruits of years of mature study. Here, sit in this comfortable chair."

"Thanks," said the youth, "but I can't. The fellows are waiting for me. We're off for a night of it--down there."

The youth pointed through the window out into the night. Instinctively the professor turned to follow the line of his finger to where a blaze of white light glowed against the dull sky of a winter evening. It was a mysterious light, compounded of arc lamps and incandescent bulbs, of flashing diamonds and shimmering shoulders, of candles burning at both ends and the scorched wings of moths.

THE APPRECIATION

"I've never been there before," said the youth; "I've sort of clung to the creed of my youth which made me pray to be delivered from temptation. I felt a responsibility for my future, and I didn't want to take risks. But thanks to your lecture, I know that all this talk of responsibility is poppycock; and so I'm off with the crowd. The fellows say that down there it's glorious until midnight, and it's glorious to the fifth power. Why didn't you give that lecture months ago? I've been a fool missing the fun."

"My boy," said the professor, wiping away the sudden dampness that chilled his brow, "sit down a moment. You see-er--that is, you mustn't take my words too literally. I--"

"Look here," said the youth almost fiercely, "you're not backing down on what you said this afternoon, are you?"

"Oh, no, no! cried the professor, snatching wildly at the house that he saw falling suddenly about his ears. "Not that, but--"

"Well, that's all. Good night! I'd feel like the duce hitting the pace if I really were responsible for it. But you said yourself a chap can't fight down his wild, hereditary impulses; he can't resist the chemical and physical forces that draw him on in spite of himself. I'd fancied I had succeeded in breaking the devil in me; but I know now that I was no more free in doing good than I shall be in tripping the primrose path. And the second's a lot easier. Thank you good night!"

"My boy," the professor's voice, was pitched high, "won't you stay with me instead. I'll explain further just what I mean. You don't quite grasp--"

The young man hesitated just a moment. There was a warning shout from the street below.

"No," he answered, "thanks just the same. I've given the crowd my word I'd go. I've fought them off for a long time with my conscientious scruples. When they invited me for a night of it, I told them honestly I had to take care of my soul. But after the lecture I didn't say that; and when they joked me about flattering myself that I was free to care for what does not really exist, you had left me no answer. So I pledged my word."

RESULTS

"You're lucky, Professor; you're not free to be bad if you wanted to. Here with the fascination of your books and studies, hedged in by strong public opinion, with your chemical forces as quiet as a crystalline compound after evaporation, everything forces you to be respectable. But study doesn't attract me, and life and laughter and love, and the whole alliterative group, do.

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Thoughts on Materialism

Leo C. Brown

While it is no doubt a good pedagogical principle to stress the most convincing proof in the first learning of a philosophic thesis, yet a man with any pretence to philosophic efficiency should certainly have at his beck and call several proofs to do service in various situations. Mr. Brown indicates a few subsidiary proofs in connection with the subject of materialism, a consideration of grave import in the philosophical world today.

A few days ago I happened upon a friend with whom I occasionally converse, while he was in a veyy reflective mood. He had been thinking of the importance of a correct philosophy as a starting point for the sciences of economics and sociology, and was disturbed by the thought that the majority of the men who are forming the thought of the country in these fields have decided leanings towards materialism and determinism. He had no *a priori* objections against materialism, he insisted, but rejected it simply because it failed to explain the facts of experience.

Finding me glad to discuss the matter with him, he proposed some of the thoughts which led him to reject materialism. They interested me, and thinking that they might interest others coming as they did from a man who is neither a Catholic nor a scholastic philosopher, I offer some of them to the readers of the M.S. Two of his chief arguments which are really identical to the scholastic arguments from universal ideas, and from ideas of immaterial things, are omitted.

An argument which he offers to pure determinists, -it seems that he has some psychologists and sociologists- his own profession- of his acquaintance in mind- is the following:

"You believe in determinism, that is, you maintain that your intellectual as well as volitional acts depend solely upon the reaction of your nervous system to physical forces.

"One of your intellectual acts is this belief in determinism.

"You admit that if the molecules of your brain happened to have a different arrangement, your reaction to phycical impulses would be different, and your acts of "intellect" and "will" would be different.

"Truth then is dependent upon the accidental arrangement of the molecules of your brain.

"Your belief in determinism is not the result of careful study of objective evidence, but is purely accidental and subjective. You cannot logically declare that other men are not free. You are in solipsism, a very undesirable state, you'll admit, for a practical scientist."

Another argument, aimed likewise at the materialists of his own profession bears some similarity to the above. As was stated before materialists and determinists are quite prominent among American economists and sociologists.

according to my friend their philosophy conflicts with their science.

It is of the essence of determinism that the mind does not freely fashion environment. "Ideas" are but mechanical reactions to physical forces; and the reaction of man to his "ideas" and of environment to man is determined solely by necessarily acting physical forces. Any direction of forces by the mind is impossible. Consequently, according to my friend, any study which presupposes that men can direct forces and fashion environment is useless. Deterministic sociologists seem to have sawed off the branch upon which their science rested.

The unlimited optimism of a certain class of materialistic evolutionists next received the attention of my friend. The men he had in mind were that class of philosophers who after depriving man of his spiritual soul and unique place among animals, make him the crown of an evolving universe - a universe which has just begun its upward march. According to them, individuals perish, but the race continues. Man must seek his happiness not in furthering his own ends, but in advancing the race. Men of yesterday were moral because they hoped for a personal eternal happiness. The man of tomorrow will have passed this state of selfishness and be moral because immorality hinders the advance of the race.

This doctrine of the increasing perfection of man appeals, of course, to science for support. Evidence for evolution in the past - if one still requires evidence - has been synthesised and presented in illustrated fashion in the Hall of the Age of Man in the Museum of Natural History. Dr. Henry Fairfield Osborne's family tree of man is concrete evidence of the vast strides that the human race has already made. That the race will continue to perfect itself is a natural inference.

My friend did not seem interested in the evidence out of which Dr. Osborne's family tree grew, nor with the logic of inferences based upon this record of mankind. He turned his attention to another scientific field.

Physicists, too, speculate about the future of the universe. A number of them hold that the supply of energy, which is the source of all life and activity in the world, is limited. They remind us that every motion of every machine in the universe, from the ticking of my clock to the whirling of a propeller which wings some lone aviator across trackless wastes, is slowly but surely reducing the supply of available energy in the universe. The day is distant, but inevitable, when life on the earth will be impossible.¹

"And what of man, the crown of the evolving universe?" asks my friend. "He will be a memory with no one to remember him."

"Science shows that man is evolving? Science shows with greater cogency that man - on the basis of materialism - is evolving towards oblivion. Why, then, be optimistic about materialistic evolution?"

(1) The question of Entropy and the End of Life in the Universe was discussed by Mr. Muellner in the Dec. '27 and Jan. '28 issues of the MODERN SCHOOLMAN.

THE MOUNT ST. MICHAEL'S PHILOSOPHICAL ACADEMY

Patrick J. Holloran

Herein are presented excerpts of papers read at the Philosophical Academy at Spokane this year. Should you wish to read more of any of these papers, it is suggested that you write to either Mr. Holloran, or to the author of the paper.

In Quest of the "to Kalon".

By Albert Henry (New Orleans Prov.)

"In Quest of the 'to Kalon.' It would bespeak no little self-sufficiency were we to dismiss with an illusion and a gesture of finality a subject to which Aristotle, Augustine and Thomas brought all their keeness of intellect and penetration of mind. It behooves us to be frank and admit that the question of the essence of the beautiful bristles with difficulty even as the fretful porcupine with quills. The reason is the old one; limitation of our intellect. Beauty is something spiritual, well-nigh intangible, certainly not palpable, usually embodied in the things we see or hear. In a word, it is something spiritual contained in objects that come under the observation of the senses. Wherefore, it readily eludes observation; or what is worse, it is often confounded with the sensible object.

The Psychology of Language.

By Alexander Tourigny (California Prov.)

We have seen language perfecting the social instinct of mankind, giving to society its formal elements, community of purpose and a sense of common obligation towards that end. We have watched man closely,- we have heard him speak, and in his speech we have come to recognize a superior being, facile princeps of the world about him. More than that; we have come upon a boundary that is not one of difference in degree only. Something new has crossed our path. It is the power of abstraction. This being, who uses language, is able to reach to something beyond the individual impressions of sense, to reach out and grasp that something underlying sensible qualities which we call the substance; to compare one concept with another and then to predicate one of another; he is able to seize upon the action of the moment, to fix it, to examine its whence and where; to reflect upon his own thought perfectly in the act of thinking; to conceive of the immaterial by negation of the material; he is able to transcend the bonds of matter; he has something new, something that is lacking in the brute creation, and that something we call a rational soul.

"And of all this the clearest and most patent evidence is language. Language is the most tangible evidence of the difference between man and brute. So tangible that many, taking the exterior for what it indicates, have placed the great dividing line here. No brute has ever pointed a paw in conscious communication. No brute will ever do so, because there is not within him the life that calls for such manifestation. His is the life of the senses. Though we may project our own thoughts into the brute, his principle of action is not that of our projection. His senses alone guide him; his pleasures are the senses;

his pains are limited by the same boundaries. He lives, he acts, he dies, - accomplishes an end, but that end is never known to him. Instinct and intelligence, - these two are both present in man, but in the brute, no. Of late years many attempts have been made to break down the barriers, to show their nothingness.

"It has become the fashion to attribute intelligence to the brute, - Yet sciences themselves galvanized to life in the search for proof of evolutionary theories have one and all brought back, instead of the expected confirmation, a widening of the demarkation between man and brute, - there is no missing link. Animal life can no more scale the lofty heights of intelligence than the sea the mighty cliffs that guard our coasts. For the tides of ocean there is a high water level; - the eternal edict has gone forth: thus far shalt thou come and no farther. To the evolution of brutes there is a mark equally as fixed, - their limit is as clearly marked as the tide line upon the beach. Thus far shalt thou come and no farther; and of that limit the eternal mark is language.

Evolution.

— By Henry Tiblier (New Orleans Prov.)

"Evolution." - Are we to believe evolutionary geologists, when they tell us that Old Mother Earth has been turning over the crust of the globe like huge pancakes, when there is no evidence besides that of the wrong order of the fossils for such gymnastics? In the Southern Appalachian Mountains we find Cambrian or Lower Silurian on the top of the Carboniferous throughout a district three hundred and seventy-five miles long and eleven miles wide. The same conditions are found in Scotland, in Switzerland and in China. In Scandinavia we have the same phenomenon over an area of more than eighty-nine thousand square miles. Shall they tell us that in reality the mountains skipped like rams, and finally came to rest on top of young strata?

"You can see from these three facts alone, how wobbly the naive major proposition of the evolutionary argument given above, becomes. These facts have shown us just the converse of what the major states; for fossiliferous strata may be found in almost every conceivable relation to each other and to the Archean, and hence, super-position, from which alone geological time can reasonably be reckoned; shows conclusively that as far back as we go the simple and complex forms of life have lived side by side, forcing us to find some other sufficient reason for the origin of species than that proposed by transformism.

The Winter of Scholasticism.

— By John McAtee (New Orleans Prov.)

"The Winter of Scholasticism." - When we inquire of the advantages of Scholasticism their interpretation of her decline after the Golden Age, we are most dogmatically informed that the essential viewpoint, the dominant characteristic of the new spirit of the Renaissance was in direct antithesis to the very fundamentals of Scholastic thought. But when we seek further and inquire what precisely was the nature, the soul and marrow of this new movement in the domain of thought that struck at the very core of the Scholastic

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On Adversaries

J. A. Gasson

Taking the well known and much disputed question of miracles as an example, Mr. Gasson of Westom, Massachusetts, suggests as the proper way of seeking a rapprochement with our adversaries in any of the disputed points of philosophy the uncovering of their fundamental suppositions.

It would be diverting if not positively enjoyable to tear the heart out of Modern Philosophy on any, even a somnolent summer's afternoon, as Huxley modestly admits having done in regard to Suarez; but such an operation, optimistic or foolhardy, depending on which side of the fence one roosts, will hardly be more successful than was Huxley's, it is to be feared. At any rate, the more one sees of modern speculative thought, the more one wonders what price human reason. When I speak of modern speculative thought, I mean philosophical thought as it is practiced by others than Scholastics and common sense people. For when one has wandered in the trail of modern thinkers along the twisting and sinuous path of Absolutism, Pragmatism, or any other kind of "ism" one is inclined to pause betimes to look around and see whence, whither and why the path.

If one sees the whence, whither and why of the doctrines held to-day one can perhaps obtain a more appreciative and sympathetic knowledge of some, the contradictions of which head our text book pages as thesis propositions. Arguments in favor of such doctrines form the bulk of the many objections we wrestle with from time to time, but I dare-say that not many of us ever look behind the objection to see what holds it up and why it was proffered. We seldom bethink about the background from which the central figure on the canvas springs yet there's a world of knowledge and information in that background. Many roads lead to Rome but just because of that, our attention should not be so fixed on Rome that the road by which one gets there is neglected altogether. If we could discover the road an adversary took to arrive at a particular argument, we might, in following that road ourselves, find an informative fact or two; or at the very least obtain a broader view of the point whence we started. If we delved into the principles and suppositions that underly and form the groundwork of a series of objections to some of our tenets we could perhaps answer and clear up a number of proximate objections by straightening out a remote principle or supposition from which they flow. Just as one can stop the flow of water in a thousand pipes by closing a valve at the reservoir.

It is in this very matter of suppositions that so many go wrong. The ultimate reason why such suppositions are made may be problematical; though one could say that it lies in a wrong orientation of the speculative and speculating mind, which orientation is due in great part to a lack of trustworthy norm and guide. But the fact remains that wrong suppositions are made by our adversaries and supply the *raison d'être* for the difficulties that sometimes sound so simple to Scholastics.

It is not what people know that bothers them; rather its only what they half-know or think they know or suppose. Let me illustrate my point from the

thesis on Miracles. To hear it urged that miracles are impossible because they are above and beyond the laws of Nature; because the laws of Nature are inviolable. All very well but before retorting with a perfectly good distinction, let us examine our objector's frame of mind and see what suppositions, if any underly the difficulty as it is proposed.

An examination of the word itself will help us so let's turn etymologists for a second and see what the word tells us of its own first and last name, as it were. Miracle is a direct descendant of the Latin "Miraculum", whose father is the adjective "Mirus". So it has a root meaning - wonderful. Now a miracle to be something wonderful must be an event outside the ordinary and established order of Nature. Furthermore, it must be an event that can effect the sensos in some way, else how could we know it as a wonderful event? But if it be outside the established order of Nature it cannot be produced by Nature itself but must be attributed to the invention of an extramundane agency; in other words to a divine power. This quite agrees with the definition given us by the Standard Dictionary, and by the Scholastics themselves. Now, then, the objector in urging his objection is making one of three suppositions on which his difficulty rests. He is supposing either, that God does not exist; or that He is not all-powerful and so cannot intervene in the workings of the world; or that He exercises no providence and so will not intervene in Nature's laws.

In these days when there are so many and varied notions of God floating about in this world it is not surprising that the non-existence of a miracle-working God is presupposed. To believe in a personal, reason-proved, God is old fashioned in the twentieth century; one must make a god to suit himself. If it be an idol with clay feet no matter; the notion of God is no more than a working hypothesis; true as long as it works and if it doesn't fit every case, why it can be changed. Hence it is we find present day philosophers telling us that God is "The name only of the ideal tendency in things" and that "the treatment of God as an external contriver, an intelligent and moral governor sounds as odd as if it were some outlandish savage religion." To modern philosophers, the connotation of the Sacred Word "May be a personal God they conceive; it may be a tendency in the universe; it may be something which they prefer to call the 'Earth' or 'Nature'; it may be an Absolute; but in any case it is not themselves and greater than themselves, something which concentrates and satisfies in itself these ideal impulses that otherwise would be tortured and broken about an imperfect self." For, 'progressive thinkers' - God save the mark - "The God-idea has become fluid again, the God of the future is in the making to be moulded into a form more consonant with man's maturer experience and more serviceable to his spiritual life." "The truth of the matter can be put," says Leuba, "in this way - God is not known, He is not understood, He is used - sometimes as a meat-purveyor; sometimes as a moral support; sometimes as a friend; sometimes as an object of love. If he proves himself useful the religious consciousness asks for no more than that. Does he exist? What is he? - are so many irrelevant questions."

It is then a matter of little wonder that the various attributes we conceive God as possessing are denied Him. For who would attribute omnipotence as we conceive it to "the undying human memory and the increasing human will," which is Wells' idea of God. "A creative spirit in ourselves, called by us Evolution, Elan Vital or Life Force" - Shaw's idea of God - can no more be credited with divine omnipotence than can the snow-man children roll together be Michael Angelo's Moses. Nor can "our unrealized ideal of a best" be the ruling providence that has set the planets in their orbits, given life to our earth and regulated the nature we see around us; any more than can the little ant-hill we carelessly flatten with our feet

for the moment. He must make us agree with him that God is a vague abstraction supplying a sentimental need in human nature: that he is the sort of being we read about in the modern God-is-love kind of novel. If he be an Atheist, he must show that God is but a name or a symbol, and religion, but a dream and a sham: If he be a Pantheist he must demonstrate that the divine essence is but the universe and that everything is everything else: that sticks and stones are the intellect that fashioned nature; that the motes dancing in the sun-beam are the hands that scooped out the verdant valleys and builded the mountains; if he be a Deist he must convince us that God is but a careless mechanic, who, after he has built this world machine, fitting in exactly every little cog and cotter-pin, is satisfied to press the button starting it and hie himself off to some cozy corner of the universe leaving our little world to its own resources. For if he could prove for us that there is no God, then miracles must go by the board since a deity that does not exist cannot intervene in the workings of nature. As well say a collegiate flivver will run without gas as to affirm miracles without God. And if admitting God's existence he could disprove His omnipotence then assuredly the laws of nature will be inviolable. How can there be an intervention of divine power if there be no power? Moreover, if admitting the omnipotence and existence of God, our objector could show that he is not provident; that the world runs on, unmindful of Him and 'tis of it; then who would care to refer to God any event in nature?

Seeing, there-fore, this background from which the objector's difficulty springs we can establish a common ground by showing that the suppositions are false and that his position needs a new foundation. Treating him in such a sympathetic manner, the adversary, if we are dealing with him in person will come to a fuller realization of the value of our solution of his difficulties; and we will appreciate more fully not only our own precious possession of Truth but also the rugged road some must follow in an attempt to reach it.

----- PHILOSOPHY AND FRIENDSHIP (Cont.)

concentrated efforts are exerted as to cut off a world vision with the covers of a text, and to fail to see the application of theses to oneself and one's neighbor, then the philosopher becomes as the life criminal in solitary confinement who would devote all his time to the study of public speaking.

At another time, I read a page from the blithesome journal of a carefree, wandering boy. Like Vergil, like Meredith, his religion was nature worship, his high ideals had as their summit natural goodness; but there was breadth to his humanity and depth to his sympathy. I had not read a page when I caught myself, book forgotten, thinking straight to the God he had, all unwittingly, found in the heart of the Vale of Cashmere.

We mentioned the typical Jesuit specialist last month. His philosophy guided him through life, but the instinct he had acquired for friendship gave him the influence that made his philosophy of value to others. He had been by nature inclined to methodism and berating himself for lack of accuracy. In friendship he found his antidote, friendship with the great, cheerful characters of literature, and with the great variety of diverse natures he found dwelling in his own house. Every one of them could open up for him a new vista of interest, and he took every opportunity to be with them, walks, common recreations, and the like. He recognized the value of his daily conversation with his greatest Friend, and in later life, his smile converted barren soil into good ground for the good seed of his philosophy.

De Magistro

Joseph A. Foley

It is a matter of surprise to some that St. Thomas ever wrote implicitly concerning education. That he touched educational matters incidently we know, as in his possibly unexcelled theory of play which Dr. Leibell has included in his "Readings in Ethics." But De Magistro is different. It descends immediately to the bed rock of education, and should remind modern man of his place in the educational scheme.

It has been said that one of the most glaring defects of modern education is the utter lack of historical background manifested by some of the writers of to-day. For, example, a professor at the University of New York blandly tells the world that he has made a "discovery". He tells us that "the conception of reality as an interrelated unity of experience is a contribution of the nineteenth century scientists and philosophers alike to the world's thought." (Philosophy of Education, Henry H. Horne, Ph.D., page 37)

Probably the statement was the result of the "Babel of confusion" that existed among the Pantheistic and Idealistic philosophers of the two previous centuries, but, if the gentleman had studied the doctrine of the Scholastics on the subject, he would not have been so reckless in presenting a new "discovery" to the world.

On this very point Saint Thomas insists that there must be a connection between the mind and the object. The maxim that "nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses" makes it clear that "the conception of reality as an interrelated unity of experience" is not a contribution of the nineteenth century scientists and philosophers.

This leads me to the discussion of Saint Thomas' Theory of Education which is contained specifically in his treatise "De Magistro". In this short treatise of four articles, done up in the dialectic style common to all of the Angelic Doctor's writing in Philosophy and Theology, we find his views on education. We must remember that the Angelic Doctor was perhaps the greatest teacher the University of Paris had ever seen in the lecture halls of that great mart of learning. He was familiar with the problems that faced the teacher in those days and was qualified to speak.

The treatise "De Magistro" is a part of the "Quaestiones Disputatae" and is treated under the general title "De Veritate", Quaestio XI. To those not familiar with Saint Thomas's method of treating a subject, the questions he asks in the "De Magistro" will have very little appeal." 1. Can one man teach another and be called master, or does this belong to God alone; 2. Can one be said to be his own teacher or master; 3 Can a man be taught by an angel; 4 Is teaching a function of the active or contemplative life?" If Saint Thomas had nothing more than an exercise of his skill in Dialectic in view when he proposed these questions, we might well consider them out of date. But, behind the veil of Scholastic Formality we find his views on education.

When he asks "Utrum homo docere alium possit et dici magister, vel Deus solus", he shows "how" man is educated. His first answer is from St. Matthew XXIII, 8: "Jnus est magister vester, et praecedit: "Nolite vocari rabbi ne divinum honorem hominibus tribuatur, aut quod Dei est, vobis usurpetis." Ergo magistrum esse vel docere, solius Dei esse videtur".

Seventeen proofs are advanced to prove that the office of teaching does not belong to man, then several proofs that it does and finally St. Thomas gives his own view of the matter. The office of teacher resolves itself under three headings: "in educatione formarum in esse; in acquisitione virtutum et in acquisitione scientiarum". The first two are without sufficient reason because they either exclude proximate causes or are purely accidental. The third seems to be St. Thomas' own view and we meet here his famous "rationes seminales" which he has adopted from St. Augustine. The "rationes seminales" are what Dr. Pace calls certain "germs of knowledge". In English we have no exact translation but it might be described as "something more than bare potency and something less than actual existence or process." In other words God has put into the soul certain latent powers that will spring forth in due time. This does not mean that St. Thomas holds innate ideas. The term "rationes" must not be translated literally, as though the mind brings into the world a store of ready made "reasons" or propositions upon which the reasoning faculty can at once be employed. "It is rather, as the word *seminales* indicates, an initial endowment out of which further processes develop".

A refutation of the objections stated in the first part of his discussion concludes the first article. The remaining articles are treated in like fashion.

To sum up the Thomistic theory of education we might say that knowledge is essentially a product of the mind and that learning is progress in self-activity. Education is not a mere cataloguing of facts or a process of being "talked at", but is rather a solicitation, suggestion and direction, by which the mind is prompted to exert its natural powers in normal ways.

While the intellect plays the chief role in the process of development, the subordinate faculties are nevertheless a sine qua non for its operation. Sense, imagination and memory are very important factors both in the first acquisition of knowledge and in its retention.

More important than the above two considerations is the suggestion made by St. Thomas in the "De Magistro". The principle part of the intellectual operation is to be attributed to God. God is the Magister Bonus. The human teacher, not figuratively but in a very real sense, cooperates in a divine work. Hence his high dignity as well as his responsibility. For it is surely no mean service that he is called to perform in fostering and developing the scientiarum semina which God himself implants and vivifies. Nor is it a trivial task that he undertakes when he leads the mind to conclusions the ultimate value of which must be determined by their relation to Original Truth. Quite aptly St. Thomas cites from St. Augustine: "Solus Deus cathedram habet in celis qui veritatem docet interius; alius autem homo sic se habet ad cathedram sicut agricola ad arborum". (De Magistro: Art. I, 8.)

Summer Reading Suggestions



HE CHURCH AND SCIENCE" BY BERTRAM C.A.WINDLE.

The studies which comprise the second year of the course of philosophy form a key to the natural sciences. No longer, as in epistemology is the philosopher able to attain to Truth by the mere analysis of mental processes and the consideration of the metaphysical order. He builds his premises now on the findings of science. Without an accurate knowledge of what science has found, and how far those findings will carry him, he cannot make progress in the development of his "world view". Besides the ability to distinguish between the true and false, the certain and probable - that clarity of thought which the first year's course has developed for him - the philosopher now needs definite factual knowledge about this world of life and matter.

From the vast and threatening pile of literature on subjects such as a book which stands out as preeminently adapted to orient the philosopher into the scientist's facts and theories on life and the material world, is Bertram Windle's "Church and Science". Besides some valuable apologetic chapters, we are presented with theories of time and space, matter and form, the origin of the universe, geological periods, evolution, Vitalism, Darwinism, Mendelism, the origin and nature of man, the soul, and other matters.

In the development of his theme, the author, while clearly showing the impossibility of contradiction between the Church and true science, skillfully sketches and appraises the principle theories of science relating to Cosmology and Psychology. The result is a valuable introduction to those branches of philosophy. The book, written in a popular, yet scholarly, style, will interest and repay careful perusal.

A. Patrick Madgett.

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION


Previous reports in these pages of the third annual meeting of The American Catholic Philosophical Association will excuse the brevity of our comments on the volume of proceedings just published. The seven papers lead us to two definite conclusions: 1.- that the program for the spread of the New Scholasticism as outlined in Fr. Zybura's book has been definitely caught by the association, for these papers are a distinctive effort to understand each other's insight into scholastic principles as well as to appreciate and evaluate the view of non-scholastic moderns; 2.- that the papers were written by men actively engaged in teaching, whose scholarly minds, acquaintance with current problems, and stimulating thought must soon reap in their students that rich productivity resulting from scholarly inspiration. As heretofore noted, the papers discuss the teaching of philosophy, current notions of matter, Whitehead's concept of an event, a comparative study of Locke and Kant, science and Philosophy, the value of authority in St. Thomas' philosophy, and the Franciscan fil of scholastics. We regret that the discussion following the papers of Sir Bertram Windle and Fr. McWilliams on Modern Ideas of Matter, and Whitehead, respectively were not included in the published proceedings.

Bernard J. Wuellner.

Conscience

Raymond H. Witte

Conscience is an early phenomenon in everyone's life, but a philosophic knowledge of it is altogether different. Mr. Witte presents this exposition of a knotty subject to MODERN SCHOOLMAN readers.



nd whispered soft a gentle voice and clear:
" It's very well you've done. Now have no fear."

From the depths of his soul he heard the voice of approval, and wondered what sort of voice could be inside him but his own; and he knew that he had not said a word to himself. His heart felt so light and free; could a boy's heart talk like a boy's mouth and tongue? Mother told him it was the voice of God whispering to him, praising him for his good action. At school the Sister said it was his Guardian Angel using the small voice of conscience to tell him he had been good. If he were bad his conscience would sting. And thus the little fellow feels how dear and near to him are his Guardian Angel and God Himself right inside him, for he heard it. How could you blame a little fellow's joy and

spirit when he realizes that inside him he has the voice of the Thunder of Sinai, and of his own Angel who always stands before the face of God in Heaven. Heaven is surely near the youngster. But really, is not conscience a remnant - the only echo now on earth - of the voice of God as He spoke to Adam and Eve in Paradise in the evening cool? It surely seems so, for the soul to whom conscience does not speak is far from God.

But bubbles always break. So it only remains for Ethics to say that conscience "est conclusio quasi syllogismi", and further, that it is but an act of the intellect.

Conscience is said to be the conclusion of a syllogism in which the major premise asserts the universal principle of a law. The minor tells the fact whether this or that particular action falls under the matter of the major. The conclusion then pronounces the verdict whether this or that action should be performed or omitted. Or, in other words, whether, with regard to performing an act, there is or is not a present obligation resting on this individual. So it is that conscience is an act of the intellect by which a man sees that he is here and now bound or not bound by an obligation. Thus, the law would say to you, "It is forbidden to steal." Then the minor would say, "This is not stealing." Then the conclusion shows me that here and now I am not bound by obligation to abstain from this act, because it is not an act of theft. That is conscience.

We must here distinguish the moral and logical aspects of the judgment of conscience. The reason is this; though a mortally certain conscience is

always an application of the general principle of the natural law of avoiding evil as far as in us lies, it does not preclude invincible error and hence the merely material violation of this or that particular law. An example will readily clarify this statement. There is, first of all, the principle of avoiding evil as far as in us lies. Using the same example as above, the major premise of this quasi syllogism would say, "You may not steal". The minor could say, "This is not an act of theft", whereas in fact it is such. The conclusion, the judgment on which the man would act will in this case be, "I am allowed to do this act". So we see that the conclusion is logically correct, but in itself morally wrong. The person is avoiding evil as far as he can, but he invincibly believes to be perfectly licit an act that may not be done under any circumstances. It is merely a material violation of the law.

Now arises the question as to how sure we must be before we may follow our conscience. The answer is that such certitude is required as will exclude all truly positive probability of the opposite's being true. All rational doubt and prudent fear must be done away with. For if we were to act with a doubting conscience we would be shoving aside prudence in that we neglected to inquire into our duty, and to dispose of our doubt. In so acting we are not avoiding evil as much as we can; we are willing to perform the act whether it be good or bad - we would be formally sinning.

This sort of certitude is surely sufficient; for the exclusion of all true, positive probability of the truth of the opposite is true certitude, and, for the most part, is as strong a certitude as can be had. Besides, what would become of the person who sought absolute certitude in every case. He would not be able to drive his automobile until he had read all the laws of the State regarding them. He would not be able to make statements on history or present-day topics without first looking up those subjects from all angles, and without being conversant with every man's opinion. He would strain and strain in his effort to sift out every chance of the opposite's being true till he got so tired and disgusted that in the end he would say, "O, what is the good of it all? If I can't be good without all this effort which is killing me, why try to be good at all. Wrong is so much easier." By trying to be morally right, he will end up by casting aside all morality, and only the overwhelming graces of God can save him from a riot of vice on earth and hell during eternity.

There comes a further question: "Granted I have sufficient certainty, must I follow my conscience? Is not my conscience merely a part of me; so that I can set it aside if it is to my advantage?" Whether commanding or forbidding, conscience is an act of the intellect by which a man perceives himself here and now bound or not bound by an obligation. Conscience, i.e., true conscience, is the application to an individual case of a law clearly known. But we are all of us bound to observe a law clearly known and duly applied. So that, whether ordering or forbidding, we must always obey our conscience. Why not set our conscience aside if it proves advantageous? We must remember that principle laid down above: Avoid evil as far as in you lies. Can any possible advantage - even a moral good - be in any way preferable when the price is the commission of a moral wrong? Conscience lays before you your duty. You cannot spurn it even to gain a moral good. You may not tell a lie even if by doing so you could empty hell.

(Cont. page. 142.)

REVIEWS

ARMCHAIR PHILOSOPHY, fourth edition, by Daniel A. Lord, S.J.,
The Queen's Work Press, 3115 So. Grand Avenue, St. Louis, Mo.,
twenty-five cents.

The cannoneers of the modern anti-Catholic warfare find their most effective weapons in cleverly written pamphlets of low price, the shrapnel of today. We have yet to repel them with their own weapon. We are in need of many such pamphlets, but especially of those that will discuss matters on a philosophical basis.

This latest edition of Father Lord's well known "Armchair Philosophy" meets the low price demand as well as the others. Every student of philosophy should have a copy; every business or professional man should have a supply on hand for his friends; every lover of truth and of the Church should know this edition. In short, bright chapters, the reverend author goes to the philosophical heart of present day problems, and presents his arguments in a way refreshing to the student and enlightening to the layman. It is Scholastic throughout, and follows the order of the conventional course so that the student may make splendid use of it, not only as an introduction, but also as a review.

We must say a word for Father Lord's style. His knack of accurately finding the crux of each argument imparts confidence and strength to his tone. The rich freshness of his imagery will fascinate the reader and the ease of the diction will lead him on, chapter after chapter, to the end.

And let it not be thought that the low price in any way jeopardizes the value. The matter is there in its entirety, the large, clear type is an improvement, and the neat external finish is apt to entice one to slip this little booklet into one's pocket or to keep it in sight on the library table for a chance five minutes during the day. We bid welcome to this new deition, and offer a prayer for its far-reaching success.

C.M.O'H.

A HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY, by Horatio W. Dresser, Ph. D.
New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. \$3.00.

This book is a sane, well-balanced, attractively bound text in its subject. In his general attitude the author is neither cynical toward the effort to attain a definitive metaphysical system, nor is he so detached a historian as to leave his work colorless. Statements like the following evidence a proper evaluation of the true nature of philosophy; the theory of knowledge has been greatly overemphasised in modern times; the Positivistic tradition from Bacon to Comte is far from being preferable to the Metaphysical deriving from Descartes and Leibniz; to suppose Pragmatism, or Instrumentalism to be in any real sense a

philosophy, or to imagine that Anti-intellectualism has successfully banished reason from the scene would be most unfortunate. "Modern Philosophy", says Dr. Dresser, "is due to the conviction that First Philosophy, or Metaphysics is extremely worth while, that philosophy seeks and can attain a world view, can become a system with the aid of the sciences."

We are a bit puzzled by this passage in the summary of medieval philosophy begining the work; "Realism meant the rule of the highest universal from which all other principles followed. Nominalism, or the assumption that universals are our own psychological terms for things, meant opportunity for free inquiry. But investigation became free only with the full right of private judgment. The implication was that rationalism may be developed and followed wherever it may lead. This is the freedom of 'natural reason', human thought in its own right, apart from all authority, even that of revelation. ----- Once free in this sense, rationalism took on another meaning, unhampered by the realistic theory of universals". Just how modern realism or any realism for that matter should hinder free inquiry is far from clear to the reviewer. To ask that ideas correspond to reality may be to ask that they give up being 'free' in a certain sense, but it is difficult to see how such freedom is compatible with their being 'thought' at all. Freethought in this interpretation is a contradiction.

The treatment accorded recent philosophy is very ample, yet, of Neo-Scholasticism no mention whatever appears in the body of the text. This is disappointing; especially since Professor Perry's section in "Philosophy of the Recent Past" and the favorable notice given in Schaub's "Philosophy Today" .

The most valuable portions of the work are the author's summaries of several trends of thought, and his statements on idealism to be found in the section on Berkeley and the Post-Kantians. An effort is made to keep in contact with the development of science, and with such periods of literary importance as the French 'Enlightenment', and German Romanticism. The volume should be serviceable to the teacher because of the excellent proportionment of its material and its generous bibliographies.

C.H.M.

THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS? by Thomas Hughes, S.J. New York
Longmans, Green And Co., New York.

The writer of the essays which are collected in this volume largely from the files of the American Ecclesiastical Review and the now unfortunately defunct American Catholic Quarterly, was for many years a familiar figure around the classic halls of this ancient university, and in spite of his long residence in Rome, is well known to American Catholics for his standard "The Jesuits of North America".

The title of this little volume is well chosen, for the "Plurality of Worlds" is not merely the title of his first essay but a token of the wide range of topics to which the author's comprehensive genius and sympathy attracted him. Cosmology, history, devotion, politics, psychology, freemasonry etc., pass in review

(Continued page 143)

We Practice What You Preach (Cont.)

There is no public opinion for me except that all college men have a certain acreage to be sown plentifully with wild oats, while the chemical forces of my nature are boiling and effervescent like Dante's sulphuric baths.

"And now I can take the whole group of "L's" to my heart, scatter wild oats till the seed sack is empty, and let the chemical forces of my nature bubble up and boil over; for I'm no more responsible than the Frankenstein was for the ruin in its wake. When I believed in free will I was a slave; with the knowledge of slave will, I am free."

As another shout from below reached the lad, he turned to go. "I'm off," he said, almost sadly. "I'd rather hate to have Mother and the girls hear of this; but even if I smash their hearts I'm not responsible for that either; so I've got to take that risk. If I sleep in class tomorrow, Professor, I'll not be to blame for that either."

The door slammed and the professor rushed wildly to the window. Below a crowd of boisterous youths were welcoming the recruit with enthusiasm. Into the throbbing cars they tumbled, and away they went into the darkness that lay between the college and that seductive strip of light, with horns shrieking and the gleam of their lamps piercing a rent in the shadow of the night.

Trembling, panic stricken at the sense of his own responsibility, the professor stood with his eyes following that flying car. It was he who had stripped the youth of the one thing that had held him back from moral ruin. His hands had flung down the bars to those turbulent passions. The sins of the youth were on his doddering old head. What, though his theories were right, that free will was a foolish dream, had it not been better a thousand times that he had never spoken? Oh, to be able to bind in once more the wild passions he had loosened, he would give----

SCIENCE TRIUMPHS AGAIN

The flame in the grate flickered, and died down and then leaped to new life. The professor half sprang from his chair. On the table lay his lecture with the ink fresh upon it. The desk calendar registered the day previous to the day set for its delivery. With a quick movement he seized the manuscript and thrust it toward the flame. He paused; smoothed the crumpled page gently, his eyes turning slowly toward that light still glowing against the wintry sky. He read the opening sentence thoughtfully, and then carefully laid the paper back on the table.

"Let science prevail," he murmured, "though the heavens fall."

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A FAR FLUNG BATTLE LINE

Scholastic Philosophy is a world philosophy. Its coming champions are studying in all quarters of the world. For the service of the Jesuits among this number, the MODERN SCHOOLMAN has made agreements with representatives who will be glad to help you in making connections with the editorial offices in St. Louis. They are: Mr. Patrick J. Holloran, Mount St. Michael's, Spokane, Washington.

Mr. John C. Rawe, Fairview, Weston, Massachusetts.

Mr. Arthur E. Gleason, L'Immaculée Conception, Montreal, Canada.

Mr. Raymond C. Blazy, Maison St. Louis, Jersey, England.

Mr. Cyril O. Vollert, Via del Seminario 120, Roma 119, Italy.

Mr. Michael D'L. Lyons, Shembaganur, Dist. Madura, India.

News and Activities

JERSEY AND FRENCH THOUGHT: The great amount of intellectual activity of France has its effect on the course of philosophy followed by the scholastics of Jersey, according to Mr. Raymond Blayz. In addition to the strict scholastic education, attention is also given to the whole gamut of French philosophy, historical and modern. Thus, any number of first, second, and third class philosophers are treated. Those modern thinkers who are, for the time being, the centers of attraction to Frenchmen find themselves much discussed at Jersey.

AT MOUNT ST. MICHAEL'S: In First year Father Donnelly's notes were followed; Remond was the nominal text book in both Psychology and Cosmology with amplifications in the form of both the respective professors' notes; Hontheim was the text for Natural Theology, and Cathrein for Ethics.

FINAL DISPUTATIONS AT THE ST. LOUIS PHILOSOPHATE: (April 24.)

ETHICS: Mr. G. Prendergast was defendant; the objectors were Messrs. W. Ryan and J. Mahoney.

COSMOLOGY: Mr. E. Flanagan, defendant; Messrs. J. Ganey and R. Gehl, C.R. objectors.

ONTOLOGY: Mr. J. Stejskal, defendant; Messrs. H. Stauffen, and J. Arnold, C.R. objectors.

PHYSICS: "High Potential and High Potential Discharges in Gases at Ordinary Pressure" Mr. E. L. Monnig, lecturer; Mr. H. A. Koch, assistant.

THE ACADEMIES IN RETROSPECT:

The Philosophers' Academy of St. Louis University will close a successful series of ten lectures on May 2nd when Mr. R. Ireland delivers his researches on "Philosophy in the Writings of Carlyle".

Mr. Orford was masterful in his exposé of Watson and his theories of Behaviorism. His informal method of lecturing and diagramming rather than reading proved a welcome change.

That "Liturgy" and "Mr. Pearl" are synonymous terms was shown by the fruits of his studies, a thorough paper on "The Psychological Element in Catholic Liturgies."

Earlier in the year Mr. Toomey delved into Wellsian Philosophy, whereas Mr. Erbacher stressed the functions of home and school in "Discipline and Child Psychology."

To demonstrate further the wide scope of the papers we need but enumerate a few more subjects: the discussion of Messrs. Prendergast and Madgett on Medieval Scholastic Philosophy; Mr. O'Hara's theories of training young writers, as stated in "Authorship - A Study in Psychology"; and Mr. Brown's report on Capital and Labor under the title of "The Challenge of the Social Problem."

As for the Psychology seminar, Father McCarthy will climax the year's work with three lectures on "The Psychology of Religious Experiences."

Theory and practice met on common ground when the able Dr. McFadden addressed a large audience on "Psychiatry with Reference to the Parent, the Teacher, the Doctor, and the Priest." His talk was as interesting as it was timely. In fact we look forward to more such supplementary addresses from Catholic laymen eminent in the professions.

(Continued, page 141.)

THE 'WINTER OF SCHOLASTICISM' (Cont.)

structure, their answers are as varied and as manifold as the colors of a crazy quilt. Nor is this strange. The age was one of transition, of change; it was restive of the old, and restless for the new, but what exactly it was, no one could tell. Yet they agree in assigning one negative factor, namely, that just as the divergent and often mutually hostile Protestant sects strike one harmonious note in "anti-papery", so the advocates of the new movement, often of hostile camps, found a common vantage ground in "anti-Scholasticism."

"The Idealists find the soul of this movement in the glorification of man; the Positivists in that of nature. Yet we know that Scholasticism was far from belittling man. It alone of all the systems recognized in man his true worth and dignity. The Idealists set up man as a little "tin god"; Scholasticism reverences him as the creature of the one true God. Nor did Scholastic thought smother man's individuality, nor nip in the bud his desire to enjoy the beauties of nature."

"What answer has Scholasticism to offer in defence of such accusations? We are sure that -----

- 1: Scholasticism, with its transcendent conception of Being, of God, the center, the source, the conservator, the goal of all other beings, in no way abrogated or destroyed the rights of man and nature.
- 2: The Positivists and the Idealists have unduly stressed one aspect of the Renaissance movement. Whatever was good and true in the Christian Renaissance could have been readily assimilated to the old metaphysics.
- 3: Factors extrinsic, and not a fatal flaw in the system itself, were the cause of the temporary decline in Scholasticism.

(The Mount St. Michael's Philosophical Academy has completed another very successful year under the direction of Mr. John E. Mullin of this province.)

NEWS AND ACTIVITIES (Cont.)

In the course of the year the members ran through the whole gamut of psychological problems bearing on "Attention", "Will and Memory Training", "Advertising", "Emotions", "Crime", and "Leadership", to mention but a few.

In their Study-Club activities the First-Year men jogged on at a steady pace until Easter in the pursuit of metaphysical will-o'-the-wisps. The two clubs report favorably on the "lights" derived from informal debate on the difficulties of "ens ut sic", "possibilia", "substantia", etc.

To sum up, no more convincing evidence need be given than the above formidable array of original efforts, to say nothing of the work entailed in publishing the "MODERN SCHOOLMAN", in proof of the fact that our Philosophers are endeavoring to put their matter to practical use.

CONSCIENCE (Cont.)

Suppose a person's conscience were incorrigably wrong? He is perfectly safe in following it, for he has made every possible inquiry so as to avoid evil and act according to law, and so, for him, his opinion is correct. He cannot be said to be wrong, for his conscience is correct. True, he sins materially, but in following his incorrigably erroneous conscience he is acting in a morally good manner; his act is formally, really, good. Do not take this as a loop-hole through which laxity may justify itself. By no means is this a way of escape from law. The man who acts from an invincibly erroneous conscience is doing his level best to square himself and his action with the law. In his mind he is absolutely right. He has searched and tried and studied in his effort to ascertain whether his opinion is true or false, and he honestly concludes that his opinion is true. Is this anything resembling a laxity that would say, "Well, it is not so bad, and besides, I'm willing to take a chance. You can't expect me to spend my time studying the right and wrong of all things." No they are far removed one from the other. The one is genuine honesty and sincerity; the other, a cloak for shady deeds.

The youngster hears within him the voice of his loving God and of his Guardian Angel. The philosopher recognizes his intellect putting an obligation on him in its command to do or to avoid this or that act. Both recognize a dictate which may not be shunned. Such is conscience; a guide directing toward the right and away from the wrong; not the Guardian Angel, but an angel never the less that urges us, when we are at our lowest, to strive, to rise up, to become our best; not exactly the voice of God, but the voice of a God-given God-seeking faculty; the practical every-day admonition to "become perfect as is also our heavenly Father

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MANUSCRIPT

Some of the articles for THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN have been submitted in forms that make the task of editing rather difficult. Representatives of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN in other scholasticates will please see to it that all articles sent in to the editor are prepared properly. We ask all readers who plan to write for the journal during the summer to note these points:

- 1.- Manuscripts should be typewritten.
- 2.- Manuscripts should be double spaced with triple space between paragraphs.
- 3.- Margins of one and a half inches should be allowed on all four sides of the page.
- 4.- Quoted titles of magazines should be in full capitals, not in quotation marks with single capitals.
- 5.- References should be inserted in the line immediately following that in which the reference occurs. The reference should be separated from the rest of the manuscript by ruled lines above and below.

-The Editors.

BOOK REVIEWS. (Cont.)

and bear testimony to the worth of another of the factors which make up the life that he sees around him, liberal education. One wonders how many of the exponents of the "Scientific Education", Exact or Inexact, which he analyses could cross as many fields of knowledge as does Father Hughes and do it with as sure a tread as he without incurring the stigma contained in an ancient comparison about fools and angels. The book bears eloquent testimony to the culture of a past generation which calls upon our best efforts to equal it.

This book has been criticized for not bringing to light anything new upon the subjects treated. I am not at all sure that they were intended to; most of them were written in the spacious eighties and we have traveled far since then. Two purposes the book does serve; it shows the capacity of an active and acute mind well trained, to take care of itself in the flux and flow of quantity production scholarship; and it brings to light a number of highly interesting points in the contemporary comment on movements which to us of the younger generation are now history.

I adduce one example. Most of us have noted in ancient philosophy texts, the use of the term 'Anthropology' where we now employ the term psychology. Father Hughes in his tenth paper traces the transformation of that terminology under the magic touch of Darwin and Lyell and quite justly sees in the restriction of the older term to the physical pre-history of man, a forewarning of the fashion in which the relative importance of physical and spiritual factors would be treated by the descendants of the same school. We know how his judgements have been borne out. "The Plurality of Worlds" is stocked with just such philosophical and cultural lore as this.

B.D.

NOTES ON A PHILOSOPHY OF CONDUCT, Dom Virgil Michael, O.S.B.
University Bookstore, Collegeville, Minn. \$1.50.

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